University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

ScholarWorks@UARK
Annual of the Arkansas Natural Resources Law
Institute

School of Law

2-1977

The Coal and Lignite Lease Compared to the Oil and Gas Lease
Phillip E. Norvell

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/anrlaw
Part of the Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons

Citation
Norvell, P. E. (1977). The Coal and Lignite Lease Compared to the Oil and Gas Lease. Annual of the
Arkansas Natural Resources Law Institute. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/anrlaw/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Annual of the Arkansas Natural Resources Law Institute by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.

16th ANNUAL ARKANSAS

NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW INSTITUTE
FORMERLY

OIL & GAS INSTITUTE
FEBRUARY 24-26, 1977

ARLINGTON HOTEL
HOT SPRINGS, ARKANSAS

"THE COAL AND LIGNITE LEASE COMPARED TO THE OIL AND GAS LEASE"

PHILLIP E. NORVELL, Assistant

Professor of Law , University
of Arkansas School of Law at
Fayetteville since August 1975
(Oil & Gas , and Property ); B.A.
and J.D. (1973), University of
Oklahoma . Trial Attorney ,
Bureau of Competition , Federal
Trade Commission , 1973 to 1975;
Member of the Order of the Coif
and the Oklahoma Bar Association .

THE COAL AND LIGNITE LEASE COMPARED
TO THE OIL AND GAS LEASE
Although oil and gas production has long dominated the state's
natural resources scene, Arkansas, this land of opportunity, has
long yielded other fruits of the earth.

Hard minerals, ranging from

the mundane, such as sand and gravel,1 to the exotic, such as dia2

monds,2

have been commercially mined here.

More importantly, from

the energy standpoint, there has been significant coal production in
the state since 1870.

Lignite, sometimes referred to as brown coal,
3
has reputedly been mined here since the Civil War.
Despite the commercial production of a wide array of hard minerals, including significant coal production, most lawyers by experience and education are oriented to the law of oil and gas.

Oil and

gas activities overshadowed other mineral transactions in the practice and legal education catered to the marketplace by teaching mineral law almost exclusively by reference to oil and gas.

As a con-

sequence, the hard minerals lease was virtually ignored.

The result

has been, absent exposure to hard minerals transactions, a lack of
familiarity with the hard minerals lease.
Due to the increased demand for energy and the continuous depletion of our oil and gas reserves, the need for alternative energy
resources has revived the coal industry.

Our vast reserves of coal,

particularly in the west, indicate that coal will probably be the
4
primary energy resource of the near future.
As a result, the buying
and selling of coal leases has increased in Arkansas.

Of more con-

sequence, however, is the current lease activity in lignite in southern Arkansas.

This deposit is part of a broad band of lignite which

spans Texas, Louisiana, southern Arkansas and Mississippi and is reported to be of a relatively low BTU value and low sulphur content

that must be surface mined.

5

The increased market activity in coal and lignite and the sheer
magnitude of the state's lignite deposit accentuates the need for a
working knowledge of the coal and lignite lease.

With this in mind,

this paper will compare the "classical" coal lease to the "classical"
oil and gas lease
coal lease:

with an emphasis on the basic structure of the

the granting, royalty (including minimum and advance

royalty), and habendum clauses.

The lessee's right of suface usage,

including the right to strip mine, will be discussed.

Additionally,

relevant clauses of coal and lignite leases in current use will be

highlighted.

The distinct inherent characteristics of oil and gas and coal
have resulted in the development of lease forms which are conceptually
8
and functionally different.
oil and gas are fugacious substances
generally found in deep sub-surface resevoirs, making them difficult
to find and, once found, it is difficult to determine the amount present.
As a result, the modern oil and gas lease is exploration oriented.
Coal and lignite, in contrast to oil and gas, are stationary hard
minerals.

Since the deposit must be of a substantial size for eco-

nomically feasible mining, the location is generally well known prior
to development.

Further, the amount of mineable coal in place on the

lessor's tract can frequently be ascertained with some certainty.
Thus, the lessor and lessee can contract with some specificity as
to the rate of production.
oriented.

The coal lease is, therefore, development

In fact, the coal lease, granting the lessee the right to

develop the mineral for the payment of royalties on production, resembles a sale of the minerals on an installment basis.

One coal

producing jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, holds generally that a coal
9
lease results in a sale of the coal in fee simple to the lessee.
-2-

Differences in the respective mining practices and mining industries also result in different lease requirements for coal and
oil and gas production.

After discovery, oil and gas may be quickly

and easily extracted and transported to a readily accessible and
continuous market.

Coal, however, requires a longer lead time for

development since the mining equipment frequently must be specially
designed and then assembled on the premises.

Finally, as coal is

moved by rail, transportation arrangements tend to be difficult and
time consuming.10
At present, lignite production is complicated by the fact that
there is no presently established market for the extracted substance
—

no current commercial use of lignite.

Furthermore, the economics

of rail transportation and the peculiar physical properties of lignite render it infeasible to transport the substance by rail.

Cur-

rent indications, therefore, point toward "on site" development and
use which will require large blocks of committed acreage to render
the project operational.

As lignite must be strip mined, with up to

150 feet of overburden being removed in some areas, reclamation is
required.

The uncertainties inherent in the development of lignite

are reflected in lignite leases currently in use.
THE GRANTING CLAUSE
The purpose of the granting clause is to effect a presently
operative transfer of an estate and to define the nature of the
interest created.

Since ownership of minerals at common law is an

incident to the ownership of land, coal and other hard minerals are
owned in place by the landowner.11

However, as oil and gas are

fugacious minerals subject to being drained by adjacent landowners,
a few jurisdictions hold that these substances are not owned in place
- 3-

but that the landowner has only an "exclusive right to take" - the
exclusive right to capture the underlying oil and gas by operations
on his land.

Such a right is an incorporeal hereditament, i.e., a

non-possessory interest.

12

Arkansas is usually regarded as an owner-

ship in place jurisdiction in which the landowner has a corporeal

or possessory interest in the oil and gas underlying his tract. 13
Therefore, in this state, the general principles of conveyancing
theoretically allow any interest that can be created in land corporeal or incorporeal - to be created in the lessee by the approp14
riate use of technical words of grant
in the oil and gas or hard
minerals lease.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, however, has refused to accord
the language of the granting clause its traditional effect in oil
and gas and hard minerals leases and has consistently held that the
lessee of the mineral lease, regardless of the specific mineral involved, has an "interest and easement in the land to explore for
15
and mine" the mineral.
This construction was adopted in Osborn v .
16

Arkansas Territorial Oil and Gas Co.,

in which the court so read

an oil and gas lease which "granted, demised and let unto the lessee
all of the oil and gas in and under said land."

The effect of this

construction is to create an incorporeal hereditament, i.e., a nonpossessory interest, despite the fact that the granting clause contained in the lease would have conveyed the oil and gas in place,
17
18
a possessory interest.
In Goodson v. Comet Coal Co.,
the court,
refusing to examine the language of the granting clause of a coal
lease in determining the extent of the lessee's interest, emphasized
the application of this construction by observing that the lease involved was "a lease in the ordinary form and the rule announced by
the court relative to the ordinary mineral lease in the case of
-4-

Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil and Gas C o ., the lease is not a

present sale or transfer to the title of the coal, but simply a contract to mine under the land..." 19
The construction of the granting clause is primarily important
in determining the remedy available to protect the interest of the

lessee. 20

Traditionally, if the granting clause vests the lessee with

a possessory interest in the minerals, ejectment would lie in the
event of eviction.

If the lease only created a non-possessory interest,

i.e., an exclusive right to take, ejectment would not lie and the lessee would be relegated to an equitable remedy.

However, difficulty

exists in the application of such traditional theory to mineral
leases.

21

If the lessee has a possessory interest in the minerals

but operations have not been commenced on the premises, the availability of ejectment as a remedy is clouded since the surface owner
is also entitled to possession and that portion of the surface that
the lessee is entitled to occupy to mine the minerals has not yet been
delineated.

If the lessee has a non-possessory interest in the miner-

als but has been in prior possession of the premises, i.e., operations
having been previously commenced, logic would dictate that ejectment
should lie upon eviction as to that portion of the premises previously
occupied despite the fact the lessee's interest is "non-possessory."
In Henry v. Gulf Refining Co.,

22

the Arkansas Supreme Court,

consistent with its previous holdings on the effect of the granting
clause, held that ejectment would lie even though the lessee's interest under the lease was "an exclusive right to take", a non-possessory
interest.

The court further intimated that ejectment would be avail-

able as a remedy irrespective of whether a prior entry had been made
23
on the premises.
-5-

Therefore, regardless of whether the mineral is oil and gas
or lignite and irrespective of the language contained in the granting clause, the court seems predisposed to find that the lease creates
in the lessee an exclusive easement to explore for and mine the
mineral which despite being a non-possessory interest will support
an action in ejectment.

The failure to accord the traditional ef-

fect to the language of the granting clause, and to follow the traditional consequences as to the effect of that clause on the availability of the remedy, has resulted in a uniformity as to the lessee's interest in the minerals and a simplification as to the nature
and effect of the lessor-lessee relationship in a mineral lease in
Arkansas.
ROYALTY CLAUSE
The royalty clause in a mineral lease provides for the "benefits to inure to the lessor as a result of the extraction of the de24
sired valuable substances."
The relatively standard uniform royalty share that characterizes the oil and gas lease (1/8 of production
free and clear of all costs) is not a trait of the coal or hard minerals lease.

Different methods of computing the lessor's royalty

share exist in the coal industry and it is not unusual to find royalty clauses utilizing different methods of computation in leases with25
in the same field.
Furthermore, regardless of the method of computation, the lessor's royalty share is not necessarily uniform since
royalty in the coal lease, unlike the oil and gas lease, is more apt
to be negotiated.
One method of computation in use in the hard minerals lease
provides that the lessor is to receive as royalty a straight monetary
26
sum for each ton or acre foot of coal mined.
This method of com-6...

putation, by fixing the lessor's return for a designated quantity of
coal, insulates the lessor from the effects of a decline in the market price but also forcloses him from participating in future mar27
ket increases.
In an age of habitual inflation, such a royalty
clause is obviously not advantageous to the lessor.
An alternative method of computation is that of basing the lessor's royalty share on a specified percentage of the market value of
the mined or marketable coal.

This method ensures that the lessor

will also realize the benefits from future increases in the market
price, but it could result in a royalty which may not reflect the
long range value of a depletable natural resource should distressed
market conditions occur.
The present trend in royalty clauses for hard mineral leases,
and the approach which appears to be in predominant use in coal and
lignite leases in Arkansas, bases the lessor's royalty share on a
combination of the above computations:

the lessor receives a speci-

fied percentage of the market value of the mined substance, but that
sum shall not amount to less than a certain specified sum per quantity removed.

This basis of computation allows the lessor to real-

ize the benefits of future price increases while placing a minimum
price floor on the amount of royalty which may be paid for the mined
coal.
MINIMUM OR ADVANCE ROYALTY
Minimum or Advance Royalty is a distinctive trait of the coal
30
lease.
Advance royalty may simply take the form of a specific sum
that the lessee is obligated to pay in advance of securing produc31
tion.
Likewise, minimum royalty may refer to the obligation of
the lessee to make a designated payment in the event that a specified
-7-

amount of coal is not mined.

32

However, the terms are frequently

used interchangeably to refer to one of the following specific contractual obligations which the lessee undertakes:

1) to pay a fixed

sum to the lessor designated as royalty regardless of whether or not
any coal is mined; or 2) to pay such a sum if the amount mined is
insufficient either to meet a specified tonnage requirement or to
33
generate royalty payments equal to a designated sum.

The extent of the- obligation of the lessee to pay minimum or ad-

vance royalties depends upon the terms of the lease.

The lessor will

normally have a right to accrued but unpaid minimum or advance royal34
ty payments.
However, one lessee who was "to mine...all merchantable... coal that can be profitably stripmine[d]" was relieved by the
court from the obligation to make minimum royalty payments upon the
exhaustion of all "merchantable coal" even though the provisions governing such payments failed to explicitly provide for this contingency.

Moreover, coal leases uniformly contain a clause which relieves the

lessee from advance or minimum payments when the production of coal is
precluded by circumstances beyond the lessee's control.

Such exclu-

sionary provisions generally encompass a wide variety of causes for
non-performance, such as acts of God, strikes, car shortages, fire,
36
etc.
Although such clauses are purportedly construed according to
the intent of the parties, they are generally strictly construed
37
against the lessee.
If such a specific provision is not included
in the lease, the lessee's obligations to pay advance or minimum
royalties will not be relieved due to circumstances beyond his con38
trol which prevent production from the mine.
IMPLIED COVENANT TO DEVELOP AND MINIMUM
AND ADVANCE ROYALTY PAYMENTS
The lessee's obligation to make minimum or advance royalty pay- 8 -

35

ments has been said to "provide a rather expensive inducement for
a lessee to commence production of ore or to relinquish the free39
hold."
The accuracy of this observation obviously relates to the
size of the payment that the lessee is obligated to make.

However,

there is a relationship, other than this inherent economic inducement, between the minimum or advance royalty payments and the lessee's
obligation to develop the property.
In Arkansas, a covenant on behalf of the lessee to explore and
develop is implied in a mining lease. The landmark case is Mans40
field Gas Co. v. Alexander,
in which the Supreme Court was faced
with a fifty year fixed term lease, on a royalty share basis, which
granted to the lessee the exclusive right to prospect for and mine
"lead, zinc, coal, gas, oil and other minerals."
failed to explore the property for minerals.

The lessee had

The court held that

the land was subject to an implied covenant to explore.

Noting that

the consideration that the lessor was to receive was not the recited
"$1.00 consideration" but the "royalties on the minerals", the
Court stated:
"the law implies a covenant upon the part of the lessee
to make exploration and search for the minerals in a
proper manner and with reasonable diligence and to work
the mine or well when the mineral is discovered, so
that the lessor may obtain the compensation which both
parties must have had in contemplation when the agreement was entered into. "41
While Mansfield is generally viewed as a cornerstone of the law
_
42
of oil ana gas,
the Arkansas Supreme Court has consistently implied
a covenant to develop in hard mineral leases covering a wide range
of substances from diamonds to sand, gravel and coal.43 In Morley
44
v. Berg,
a case involving gravel, the court observed that "the
duty of complete development is inherent in all mining leases that
provide a royalty to the lessor."
-9-

The implied covenant to develop requires the lessee to commence
45
exploration or development with "reasonable diligence",
a notion
which depends on the facts of each case, having regard to various
relevant factors including the size and accessibility of the property, the usual method of development in similar situations and the
46
expenses involved.
Once development has been commenced, the lessee
47
is obligated to continue production with reasonable diligence.
If
the implied covenant to develop is breached, the lessor may seek
48
49
cancellation based on a forfeiture
of the lease or damages.
Naturally, in order to permit flexibility in his mining operations, the lessee may desire control over development independent of
the obligations implied by law.

Lease provisions which require that

advance or minimum royalty payments be made to the lessor provide
the mechanism by which the lessee may exercise such control. 50 Minimum and advance royalty payments satisfy the lessee's implied covenant to develop and permit the lessee to indefinitely delay or even
to forsake development.

51

In essence, the minimum or advance royal-

ty payments clause in the hard minerals lease discharges the lessee's implied obligation to explore and develop just as the delay
rental clause in the oil and gas lease discharges the lessee's implied obligation to drill an exploratory well.

Therefore, minimum

or advance royalty payments should properly be regarded as a substi52
tute for production.
The lessee's satisfaction of the implied covenant to develop by
paying minimum or advance royalties has been based on different
theories.

One such theory is that as such payments constitute con-

sideration to the lessor for the lessee's privilege to defer develop-

ment, 53 the inclusion of minimum or advance royalty provisions clearly
indicate that the parties did not contemplate continuous development;
-1o-

the lessor, therefore, cannot complain for lack of development.

54

As this theoretical basis obviously emphasizes the intent of the parties, it is tantamount to holding that since the parties have expressly agreed on the matter of development, no room to imply a covenant
exists.

Other courts, however, have labeled minimum or advance

royalty payments as enforceable liquidated damages,

a sum agreed

upon in advance by the parties as the damages which will accrue to
the lessor on breach by the lessee of the implied covenant to develop.
As the purpose of the minimum or advance royalty provision in
the hard minerals lease somewhat parallels that of the delay rental
clause in the oil and gas lease, it is not surprising to find that
that provision satisfies the implied covenant to develop on the same
legal basis as the delay rental clause discharges the lessee's implied obligation to drill an exploratory well.

The delay rental pay-

ment is also viewed as consideration paid to the lessor for the lessee's privilege to defer exploration.

Therefore, as the parties

have defined the extent of the lessee's obligation as to develop56
ment, no room for implication exists.
Furthermore, a minority
view apparently exists which also categorizes delay rental payments
57
as enforceable liquidated damages.
In Arkansas, the cases suggest that the advance and minimum royalty of the hard minerals lease and the delay rental clause of the oil
and gas lease operate on the same legal theory to satisfy their re5 8
spective implied covenants. In Inman v. Milwhite,
an Eight Circuit
Court of Appeals decision applying Arkansas law, the lessor sought
cancellation of a soapstone mining lease, inter alia, for breach of
the implied covenant to develop.

The lease contained a provision

allowing payment of minimum royalties "in lieu of all development
operations” for the year in which payment was tendered.
-11-

The lessee

had not diligently mined the property but had tendered minimum royalty payments as provided by the lease.

The court rejected the lessor's

claim of a breach of the implied covenant:

"where, as here, however,

the contracting parties have specifically dealt with the question of
development and operations their agreement governs and there can be
59
no room for implication."
In certain instances, however, payments labeled as advance or
minimum royalties and paid to the lessor may not satisfy the lessee's
implied covenant to develop.

For example, a lump sum payment made

to the lessor at the execution of the lease, even if denominated as
a bonus or advance royalty, may not negative the lessee's implied
covenant to develop.

6 0 an

In Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar,

Arizona

case involving a feldspar lease, the lessee initially paid $3800 to
the lessor as advance royalty which could also be credited against
future royalties.

The court held that notwithstanding the payment

being labeled as an "advance royalty", the lessee's failure to develop
resulted in a forfeiture of the lease as "a lease [in] which [the]
...main consideration moving to the lessor is to be... royalty...im61
poses upon the lessee the duty to develop.
This principle is also applicable to the implied covenant to
explore in the oil and gas lease, as recognized in Arkansas in Ezell
62
v. Oil Associates, Inc.
There, the lessor brought suit for cancellation for breach of the implied covenant to explore despite the
fact that he had received a bonus of 3000 shares in common stock of an
operating oil company controlled by the defendant lessee.

Neverthe-

less, the court held that the lease was subject to an implied covenant to explore.

As to the effect of the bonus, the court noted

that "the principal consideration for the lease was the payment to
the lessors of a part of the oil and gas produced on the leased
- 12 -

premises."
Both Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar and Ezell v. Oil Associates, Inc
follow traditional theory that the principal consideration moving to
the lessor is the royalties accruing from the extraction of the min63
rals.
The bonus or other designated lump sum payment merely rep64
resents the consideration for executing the lease.
Such a payment,
regardless of the size, is not to be considered as a representation

by the lessor that exploration or development may be deferred.

The

argument has been made, however, that advance royalty in the coal
and lignite lease should be distinguished from the bonus in the oil
and gas lease and treated as "true royalty" due to the obvious intent
65
of the parties.
On the reasoning reflected in Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar, it
has been argued that advance or minimum royalty payments credited
against future royalties accruing on actual production should not
negative the existence of the implied development covenant.

66

If

such payments are not credited or are only partially credited, the

sum not so credited clearly constitutes consideration paid to the
lessor for the privilege to defer mining operations.
ment is obviously in the nature of delay rentals.

Such a pay-

If the sum paid

is to be applied against future royalties, arguably no consideration
is being paid for that privilege.

However, the receipt of payments

that represent royalties in advance of production is a benefit to
which the lessee is not otherwise entitled and should, therefore,
constitute the required consideration for the lessee's privilege to
defer production.
Furthermore, some jurisdictions hold that nominal minimum or
advance royalty payments in a hard minerals lease do not satisfy the
lessee's implied covenant to develop and the lease, absent develop-13-

merit, is subject to forfeiture. An illustrative case is Dulin v.
67
West,
a Colorado decision in which the lessee secured from the
lessor a 20 year lease to mine peat moss.

The lease provided for

both monthly royalty and an annual rental payment of $10.00.

The

lessee attempted to hold the lease by making annual rental payments
but the lessor sought cancellation due to the breach of the implied
covenant to develop.

The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the de-

fendant's argument that the annual rental payment negated the existence of the implied covenant to develop:
When minimum royalties and annual rentals provided for
in a lease are reasonably substantial in relation to
the anticipated return from the property, they are in
effect an agreed compensation to the lessor for the lessee's failure to achieve reasonable production. -The rule is otherwise, however, where the minimum annual rental is miniscule in relation to reasonably contemplated profits from the operation. 68
The other jurisdictions which follow the Dulin holding are
Indiana,6
9

Kentucky7
0

and Wyoming7
.
1

To put the Dulin line of cases

in their proper perspective, it must be noted that each of these
jurisdictions, except possibly Wyoming, follow the old Indiana rule

72

which held that payment of a nominal sum as delay rentals did not
satisfy the oil and gas lessee's implied obligation to drill an exploratory well.

The basis of the Indiana rule, by implication, is

that the lessee should not thereby be permitted to tie-up the property and speculate on its fluctuating values when actual exploration
and development of the property is the contemplated result of the
lessor-lessee relationship.

Arkansas clearly rejected the Indiana
73
rule in Lawrence v. Mahoney
and the concept that a nominal sum delay rental payment will satisfy the oil and gas lessee's implied
covenant to explore is firmly entrenched here.
If the Dulin line of authority does not merely reflect a minority view as to the efficacy of a nominal sum payment on the implied

covenants to explore or develop in a mineral lease, these cases may
have potential significance in Arkansas in that some coal and lignite leases have provided advance or minimum royalty of $1.00 per
acre.

Arguably, the issue is rendered moot by the inclusion of a

clause in such leases that expressly provide

that no express or
74
implied covenant to develop is contained in the lease.
Following

traditional legal theory as to implied covenants, when the parties
have specifically contracted as to the subject of development, no
75
room exists to imply such an obligation on behalf of the lessee,
If a distinction exists between the hard mineral and the oil
and gas lease that results in a nominal sum payment failing to satisfy the former lessee's implied covenant to develop, even though
such a payment will discharge the latter lease's implied covenant to
explore, it is that as to the oil and gas lease: the mineral, the
subject matter of the lease, is not known to exist on the leased

premises.7
6

This fact can only be determined by the drilling of an

exploratory well:

an expensive and, as oil and gas may not be

found in paying quantities, risky undertaking.

If the exploratory

well results in a dry hole, the lessee suffers a total loss of his
substantial investment.

The risk inherent in discharging the implied

covenant to explore by drilling is a basis for the holding that if
the parties to the lease so provide, that obligation may be satis77
fied by the payment of a nominal sum.
Furthermore, augmenting the holding that nominal sum payment
should discharge the implied covenant to explore is the fact that
the drilling of a well reveals, to a certain extent, the potential
78
of tracts near its proximity to produce oil and gas.
Evidence of
this phenomena is the common practice of block leasing, i.e., the
leasing of several tracts to secure a block of leased acreage to
-15-

ensure the right to fully develop any possible producing formation
discovered by the planned exploratory well.

If an unsuccessful ex-

ploratory well is drilled on an adjacent tract, the lessee, if his
lease so provides, should be permitted to discharge the implied
covenant to explore by payment of a nominal sum.

To require the

lessee, on pain of forfeiture, to drill what is likely to result in
another dry hole, would only encourage economic waste and increase
the cost of oil and gas production.
If the risk inherent in oil and gas exploration is the basis
for permitting a nominal sum payment to discharge the implied drilling obligation, should not the lessee of the lignite lease be accorded the same privilege as to the implied development covenant?
After all, lignite does not as of yet have an established market.
Even if such a market develops, it may be limited to on-site utilization which could mean that the availability of sufficient committed acreage near the leased premises to render such a project
operational would ultimately determine if the lignite underlying the
tract is to be mined.

The lignite lease would appear to be as

fraught with risk for the lessee as is the oil and gas lease.

Since advance or minimum royalty payments in the hard mineral lease

serve a similar purpose and operate via the same legal theory as does
the delay rental payment in the oil and gas lease, the clause in the
hard minerals lease may be drafted to function the same as the delay
79
rental payment in the drilling clause of the oil and gas lease,
i.e., to operate in lieu of development either as a "special limitation" in which the failure to timely pay the designated sum results
in the "premature" termination of the lease or as breach of a "covenant" to pay the designated sum for which the lessee incurs liability.
Although historically the development oriented hard minerals lease
-16-

did not pattern the advance or minimum royalty clause after the
unique drilling clause of the exploration oriented oil and gas lease,
current coal and lignite lease forms in Arkansas have been drafted
to conform to the operation of the drilling clause.

80

This develop-

ment indicates that some prospective producers of lignite demand the
ability to prematurely terminate the lease and thus avoid advance
royalty payments.
HABENDUM CLAUSE
The basic function of the habendum clause is to define and limit
the duration of the lessee's estate.

Although the habendum clause

serves the same purpose in both oil and gas and hard minerals leases,
the two leases have historically utilized different habendum clauses
as the result of the basic distinctions between the two leases and
the respective industry mining practices.

The standard form haben-

dum clause in the oil and gas lease provides for a short primary
term of five to ten years with a secondary term of "so long as oil
and gas is produced."

The oil and gas lease is therefore capable of

being of indefinite duration.

82

This type of habendum clause is

required since the probable life of the well is virtually unpredictable and the lessee who hazards the risk of exploration wants to
realize the full benefit of his investment.

In contrast, the haben-

dum clause in the coal lease was usually of fixed duration but in
modern times it has provided for an extension for an additional fixed
period.

Since the probable life of the mineral deposit can frequent-

ly be ascertained, the lessee will seek a lease of sufficient duration to permit, the opening and full development of the mine with additional time to secure a market and to arrange for necessary trans-17-

81

portation.

The lessor, however, wants the duration of the lease

limited in order to secure a rate of production which will ensure
a profitable return from the royalties.

The habendum clause in the

coal lease is, therefore, more likely to be the result of negotiation
between the parties.
The habendum clause of the modern oil and gas lease is a product of evolution -- predecessor lease forms contained habendum
clauses which provided for straight long primary term and "no term"
leases.

83

Although the modern habendum clause of the coal lease

is also a product of evolution, the coal lease, unlike the oil and

gas lease, has not evolved a relatively standardized uniform habendum clause.
The "No Term" Lease
Although rarely used now, early coal leases sometimes did not
specify any term.

The habendum clause indicated that the duration

of the lease would be "until all workable and merchantable coal
84
shall have been mined."
In the early days of the oil and gas industry, "no term" leases were used which also characteristically
provided for an indefinite number of extensions by payment of annual
85
delay rentals.
The purpose of the "no term" oil and gas lease was
to permit the lessee to extend the period of exploration indefinitely for as long as the lessee was willing to speculate with the
leasehold.

For this reason, the courts treated no term leases

harshly and generally held that such leases were either invalid due
to lack of consideration, terminable by the will of the lessor, or
valid but subject to an implied covenant to drill an exploratory
well on pain of forfeiture.

86

However, if the coal lease is truly
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a development lease and subject to an implied or express covenant
to reasonably and diligently develop, there is no reason to question
87
the validity of the "no term" coal lease.
The Definite Term Lease
The habendum clause of the definite term lease merely provides
that the lease will exist tor a definite specified duration — - most
commonly 20 years.

88

Absent abandonment or the exercise of an express

surrender clause, duration of the lease is for the specified period.
The definite term clause lease is rarely, used today due to its failure to protect the interests of the lessee.

If the specified term

was too short, the lessee ran the risk of premature termination.

The

lease would end prior to exhaustion of all mineable coal and the
lessee either lost the full benefit of his investment or faced the
unenviable prospect of having to negotiate an extension of the lease.
More obnoxious to the lessee was the fixed long term lease in which
the lessee found himself obligated to pay minimum royalty even after
90
the commercial coal had been exhausted.
Finally, the lessor found
the fixed long term lease providing for low minimum royalties undesirable as the lessee had no obligation to mine and the property was
tied up for an extended period of time for a low monetary return.
A modification of the definite term clause is the long fixed
term lease that provides for an earlier termination when all "mer91
chantable and mineable coal" has been mined.
The problem presented
by the use of this type of habendum clause arises upon termination
of the lease when all mineable coal has not been mined.

That portion

of the coal not mined cannot, thereafter, be recoverable since extraction equipment cannot be economically installed to remove only
a small amount of coal.

The lessor, therefore, could be deprived of

89

the full development of this natural resource.

Merchantable coal

has been construed as being coal of a quality that is "salable" on
92
the market.
"Mineable coal" has been construed as being coal so
situated that it can be mined at a reasonable profit to the lessee.

93

The lessor has been required to shoulder the burden of proof as to
94
the continued existence of "merchantable and mineable" coal.
Definite Term with Renewal or Extension Periods
The most widely used lease form, and the modern trend, provides
for a relatively short definite term (analogous to the primary term
in the oil and gas lease) with a provision for renewal or extension
95
for an additional fixed period of time.
The right to extend the

lease at the end of the primary term fully protects the interest of
the lessee.

Frequently, coal leases require that the lessee give

written notice of the decision to renew the lease within a specified
96
period of time prior to the end of the primary term.
The notice
requirement provisions have been held to operate as a condition precedent to the renewal of the lease and time, therefore, is of the es97
sence.
Other leases have provided a self-executing clause that ex98
tends the lease "so long as" the mineral is being mined.
Oil and Gas Habendum Clause
In recent years, habendum clauses in hard mineral leases fashioned after the oil and gas lease have appeared in reported decis99
ions.
Such leases typically provide for a primary term and the
typical oil. and gas lease secondary term adapted to hard minerals, "as
long as the leased premises are being mined or ore is being produced."
In fact, current coal and lignite leases in use in southern Arkansas
are characterized by an extended primary term and "as long as coal
is produced in paying quantities".

In Inman v. Milwhite.100 the

lease contained a habendum clause that provided in part "as long
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as paying quantity production of soapstone ... is continued."

The

lessor argued, inter alia, that the lease should be cancelled as it
was not producing in paying quantities.

In deciding this question,

the court reasoned that, since the solid mineral lease resembled oil
and gas leases, the definition of paying quantities relevant to
the oil and gas lease would be applicable. The court then applied
101
the Clifton v. Koontz
prudent operator standard to determine if
production in paying quantities existed.

Milwhite clearly indicates

that the habendum clause of the oil and gas lease is adaptable to
the coal lease and that the courts will give the same effect to the
language regardless of the mineral involved.
SURFACE USUAGE, SUBJACENT AND LATERAL
SUPPORT AND STRIP MINING
Frequently, the mineral estate is described as the dominant
estate and the surface estate as the servient estate.

More accurate,

however, is the statement that the mineral estate and the surface
estate are each "mutually" dominant and "mutually" servient.

The

mineral estate is dominant and the surface estate is servient in
the sense that the mineral estate has the right to such use of the
surface estate as is reasonably necessary for exploration and the
extraction of the mineral.

102

This right is implied from the grant

severing the minerals from the surface in order to permit the mineral
103
owner or lessee to enjoy the interest conveyed.
However, the surface estate is the dominant estate and the mineral estate is the
servient estate in the sense that the servient estate is entitled
104
to subjacent and lateral support from the mineral estate.
This
right of the surface owner does not rest upon a grant, express or
implied, but is a proprietary right, sometimes referred to as a third
-21-

estate in the land,

105

which may be held or conveyed separately and
106
distinctly from either the surface or the minerals.
107
The Arkansas Supreme Court in Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode,
in

describing the rights of the mineral owner, indicated that reasonably
necessary use of the surface for exploration encompasses an easement
of ingress and egress to prospect for and remove the substance, the
right to erect all necessary applicances for removal, and the right to
occupy as much of the surface as is reasonably necessary for mining
108
purposes.
The mineral owner or lessee, as the owner of the dominant estate, must enjoy his right to the use of the surface with due
regard to the interests of the owner of the surface estate, i.e.,
109
the servient estate.
Excessive or unreasonable use of the surface
by the lessee will result in liability.

110

Negligent operations re-

sulting in surface damages has also been the basis of liability for
the mineral owner or the lessee.

111

Oil and gas operations in modern times have generally been marked
by a lack of substantial interference with the surface of the property.

112

Recent petroleum exploration and production usually require

surface space only for a well site, battery tanks, settling tanks and
sub-surface gathering lines.

Thus, the oil and gas lessee and the

surface owner have been able to co-exist with each enjoying their
113
respective property interests.
Instead of relying on the right by implication of reasonably

necessary surface usage, the typical oil and gas lease provides for
various easements in the surface which expressly delineates the op114
erations which the lessee may conduct on the leased premises.
A
representative sample of lease included easements are the right to
lay pipelines, construct roads and dams, install tanks, erect power
stations and to conduct secondary operations.
-22-

115

Some leases also

contain a surface damage clause which obligates the lessee to compensate the surface owner for certain specified injuries to the
116
premises.

Deep or drift mining, which basically involves "underground"

mining is the traditional method of mining coal.

Deep mining in-

volves the sinking of a vertical shaft into the subsurface and the
developing of underground tunnels and passageways from which the coal
117
is withdrawn and removed through the shaft.
Deep mining further
utilizes portions of the surface for tramways, tipples and other
118
structures necessary to process and transport the mined coal.
Deep mining leaves the surface substantially usable by the owner of
119
the surface.
The coal lease has followed the practice of providing express
easements which define the extent of the operations that the lessee
is entitled to engage in on the leased premises.

120

The provisions

for express easements generally grants the lessee the right of

ingress and egress upon and through the surface and subsurface with
additional easements for construction and maintenance of transportation and development facilities.

121

The coal lease frequently pro-

vides that the lessee may deposit debris on the property.

122

The bane of deep mining coal operations is the subsidence of the
surface due to the removal of the underlying strata which results
in the liability of the lessee for failure to provide subjacent and
lateral support to the surface.

Subjacent support is the right of

the surface owner to have the land supported by underlying strata. 123
Lateral support is the right to have the surface supported by adjoin124
ing land.
Subsidence of the surface due to coal mining operations
has been a problem in Arkansas.
In Western Coal Mining Co. v. Young,
-23-

125

the lessee had operated

a mine 180 feet below the surface and had originally left pillars
of coal throughout the mine to support the surface.

However, the

lessee later mined the pillars which resulted in the surface subsiding and the surface owner's water well being drained.

The Ar-

kansas Supreme Court, in affirming a verdict for the surface owner,
rejected the defendant lessee's argument that it had the right to
remove the coal without regard to the damage that occurred to the
surface by reasoning that "if the land is owned by one person and
the minerals by another, the owner of the minerals cannot remove
them without leaving natural or artificial support to sustain the
126
surface."
The court further noted that the surface owner's right
to subjacent support is absolute and his cause of action for damages
resulting from subsidence is not predicated on establishing negli127
gence on behalf of the lessee.
In Paris Purity Coal Co. v. Pen128
dergrass,
a subsequent lateral support case, the court pointed
out that as to lateral support, the surface owner's right is absolute as to the land in its natural condition; but, as to buildings
or other improvements, the lessee will not be liable for damages
resulting from failure to provide adequate support in the absence of
negligence.

This distinguishes lateral support from subjacent sup-

port since as to the latter the lessee is absolutely liable not only
as to the soil in its natural condition but also as to the buildings
129
or other improvements.
The court stated that the right to subjacent and lateral support can be expressly waived by apt language
130
in the grant which severs the minerals from the surface.
Also, it
131
is generally recognized that waiver can be accomplished by contract.
A different method of mining coal and lignite is open cut, or
strip, mining.

This process involves the tearing away of the earth

surface and the horizontal extraction of the mineral.
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As the over-

burden and the mineral deposit is totally removed, the surface is
completely destroyed.

Strip mining is not a recent technological

development since coal has apparently been strip mined in some parts
132
However, with the
of the U.S. since the turn of the century.
development of power shovels and modern stripping equipment, open
133
cut mining is the most economical method of removing the coal
where it is not precluded by the depth of the deposit.

More import-

antly, as to shallow deposits of coal and lignite which are located
so close to the surface that insufficient overburden exists to permit deep mining, strip mining is the only method to extract the mineral.

Since strip or open cut mining destroys the surface, a question
arises as to whether the mineral owner or lignite owner has the right
to mine the coal and lignite?

If so, what is the basis for the right

of the lessee to destroy the surface by extracting the mineral?

Is

the right to strip mine derived from the reasonably necessary use
of the surface estate implied in the grant to the mineral owner, or
is the right implied in law on the ground that the mineral estate is
inactuality a truly dominant estate with an incident of its ownership being the right to destroy the surface estate?

The obvious

argument for the mineral estate to be treated as such a dominant
estate is that without this dominant right the mineral estate may be
134
135
worthless.
However, the rule is clearly established
that the
lessee or mineral owner does not have the right, either implied by
136
law or implied from the grant, to so destroy the surface.
The majority view is based on the fact that the right implied by grant to
reasonably and necessary use of the surface by the mineral owner does
not permit strip mining as the right to "use" does not include the
right to "destroy"

137

Furthermore, the concept of a truly dominant
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mineral estate which permits the mineral holder to strip mine, which
would be a recognized paramount interest in the real property, simply
does not exist or has failed to materialize due to the perception of
the courts that the right to destroy the surface should be resolved
on the intent of the parties at the time of the severance of the min138
erals from the surface.
Apparently, California is the only jurisdiction that has held that the right to destroy the surface by strip
139
mining is an incident of the onwership of the minerals.
As the right to strip mine is not implied in the grant or by law,
the lessee will only have the right to utilize open cut mining if the
lease expressly provides for that method of extraction and the coal
and lignite has not been previously severed from the surface.

How-

ever, if the rights to the coal and lignite have previously been
severed from the surface rights, the lessee may only acquire the
right to strip mine from the lessor if the deed of severance reflects
the intent of the parties that the mineral owner could strip mine or
extract the mineral by destroying the surface.
The principal case in Arkansas relating to strip mining is Ben140
ton v. U.S. Manganese Corp.
The owner of the united surface and
mineral estate granted by deed to the mineral owner's predecessor in
title the "right to mine, excavate, and prospect for minerals and
ore."

The grant further provided that the owner of the surface estate

would hold the owner of the mineral estate harmless "from liability
on account of accident or death to stock of any kind, which might
be injured by falling into pits, excavations, etc., on said lands
made by grantees or its assigns in mining and prospecting on said
property, ..."

Thereafter, the surface rights were conveyed to the

present surface owner.

The mineral owner then started to extract

the manganese by strip mining as that was the only method by which

the mineral could be mined.

Initially, the surface owner was to con-

duct and manage the strip mining operations for the mineral owner
for a certain sum per ton of the extracted manganese.

The amount re-

ceived by the surface owner was deemed sufficient by him to justify
the destruction of the surface.

However, the mineral owner later

dispensed with the surface owner's services and made other arrangements for the strip mining operations.

Afterwards, predictably, the

surface owner attempted to prevent the mineral owner and his employees from entering upon the premises to strip mine.

When the mineral

owner sought an injunction to prevent the surface owner from interfering with the mining operations, the surface owner defended the
action on the basis that the complete destruction of the estate by
strip mining constituted an illegal invasion of the surface estate.
The trial court granted the injunction and the surface owner appealed.
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the supreme court
examined the language of the deed which severed the minerals from the
surface to determine if the intent of the parties was that the mineral owner should have the right to strip mine.

The court, obviously

influenced by direct reference to "pits, excavations, etc." held
that the "opening of pits was contemplated by the conveyance of the
minerals and the owner of the surface estate took with notice of such
conveyance. „141

The court in Benton followed the general rule of construction
in determining if the intent of the parties to the severance deed
was that the mineral owner could destroy the surface in extracting
the mineral.

The court determined the existence of the requisite

intent by looking to the language of the instrument.

In Benton the

severance deed clearly reflected the intent of the parties.

If, how-

ever, the severance instrument is amoiguous, resort to extrinsic
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evidence to determine the intent of the parties is required. In
142
Phipps v. Leftwicn,
the Virginia court utilized a method of con143
struction which may have potential significance for Arkansas.

There, the court resolved the ambiguity by looking to the "common
practices" —

the practices and methods of mining that were used in

the area at the time of the grant.

If strip mining was a known

method of recovery used in the area at the time of the execution of
the deed, that: method of extraction would be permitted unless it
were specifically excluded by that grant.

The "common practices"

approach has also been used by other courts as evidence of the intent
144
of the parties.
Other extrinsic evidence which has been considered by courts as part of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the severance instrument and bearing on the intent of the
parties includes:

whether the price paid for the minerals equaled
145
or exceeded the actual value of the land;
the physical character
146
of the land, i.e.,
whether the land was improved agricultural
land or uninhabited mountainous land; the present existence of reclamation statutes which provide for a scheme of restoration for strip
147
and the waiver either of the right to subjacent supmined land;
port or the right to surface damages by the grantor of the severance
148
deed.
Both a constructional preference against the intention to
149
strip mine
and the practice of construing the ambiguous deed more
150
strongly against the grantor
have been adopted by some courts.
Even if it has been established that the parties to the deed of
severance contemplated that the mineral owner can strip mine, there
is a question remaining as to whether the surface owner has to be
compensated for the destruction of the surface estate.
Supreme Court in Buchanan v . Watson

The Kentucky

held that a mineral owner

holding under a "broad form" mineral deed, which provided that the
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grantee could use the surface "in any and every manner that may be
152
deemed necessary or convenient for mining"
with a complete waiver
of surface damages, could strip mine the land and destroy the surface without compensating the surface owner except for "oppressive,
arbitrary, wanton or malicious" exercise of that right.

The basis

for the holding was that the all inclusiveness of the grant with the
waiver of surface damages indicated that the parties intended the
"estate reserved by the grantor to be subservient to the dominant
153
estate of the grantee."
Later, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining
154
Co.,
which affirmed the holding in Buchanan, addressed the argument that the landowner must have contemplated that the surface would
retain its value for agricultural or residential use or they would
have deeded the whole title to the mineral owners.

The court merely

noted that the landowner "chose to retain the bare title simply for
155
what little value, if any, it might have."
The Arkansas court in Benton rejected Buchanan and the approach
of the Kentucky court and held that if the mineral owner exercises
his right to destroy the surface by strip mining, the surface owner
must be compensated.

After making the following observation in Ben-

ton :
...the digging of the pits results in the complete
destruction of the surface, and the removal of the
surface to washing plants leaves the surface owner
with nothing but a "hole in the ground" for agricultural pursuits.156
The court then reasoned that "to deprive ... the owners of the surface estate -—

of any right for damages for the complete destruction

of the surface would be to make the conveyance of the surface as a
157
mere nullity."
The court indicated that this holding was compel158
led by Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Young,
which held the lessee
liable for failure to provide subjacent support.
-29-

Although the court

did not specifically indicate why the duty to provide subjacent support necessitates the holding that the mineral holder must compensate
the surface owner when the right, acquired by grant, to strip mine
is exercised, the West Virginia Supreme Court in W.Va. Pitts. Coal
Co. v. Strong,

indicated the reason:

Certainly, if the
prietary right to
an equal right to
ported, i.e., the

owner of the surface has a prosubjacent support, he has at least
hold intact the thing to be supsurface.160

Even though the Arkansas Court in Benton held that the holder
of the mineral estate has to pay for the destruction of the land by
strip mining, it remains to be seen whether the court will liberally
construe such general language as "all the minerals in under or upon"
with right of "egress to remove the same," which is endemic to earlier
mineral grants, as granting to the mineral holder the right to strip
mine the property.

This issue must be resolved to determine if the

mineral estate is truly dominant.
CONCLUSION
Although the hard minerals lease is typically unknown to the
practioner and lacks the developed case law that accompanies the oil
and gas lease, it should not be viewed as an enigma.

Even though

differences exist as to the royalty clause and, in older leases, as
to the habendum clause, the major difference in the basic structure
of the respective leases is the minimum or advance royalty clause
which merely serves the same purpose as to development in the hard
minerals lease as the drilling clause serves as to exploration in
the oil and gas lease.

The distinction is further minimized in coal

and lignite uses in current use since advance or minimum royalty is
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framed as a special limitation or a covenant to function the same
as the drilling clause in the oil and gas lease.

Functional differ-

ences between the respective leases have been further diminished by
current coal and lignite leases uniformly adopting the indefinite
secondary term of the oil and gas habendum clause.

In effect, a

standard form "mineral lease" drafted to function like the familiar
oil and gas lease and applicable to fugacious as well as non-fugacious minerals, appears to be in evolution.

The obvious result will

be, to a great extent, an obliteration of the historical differences
between the hard minerals lease and the oil and gas lease.
This is not to say, however, that extensive lignite development
will occur without impact on Arkansas law.

Important legal issues

that may require resolution include the further delineation of what
constitutes a grant of the right to strip mine in the deed of
severance; the protection to be accorded to the owners of other
minerals by a lignite lessee contemplating strip mining; the rights
if any, of land owners adjoining tracts being strip mined; and the
actual implementation of varying standards of reclamation.

The

natural resources bar now faces the challenge inherent in the commerical development of a "new" energy resource that entails extensive
surface disturbance to mine.
Phillip E. Norvell
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